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FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND THE
SECURITY STATE
Kerry Abrams*
When does an individual’s interest in reunification with a
family member outweigh a sovereign nation’s interest in
controlling its borders? This question, long debated by courts,
legislators, and policy-makers, is now emerging as an important
civil rights issue for the general public. President Donald J.
Trump’s recent executive orders banning immigrants from several
predominantly-Muslim countries had the effect of separating
spouses from spouses, parents from children, and children from
grandparents.1 These separations were quickly seized upon in the
media as violations of human decency and civil rights.2 Although
courts granted injunctions of the orders primarily due to the
likelihood that enforcement of them would violate the procedural
due process rights of green-card holders and the free exercise of
religion rights of Muslims, the issue of family reunification was
raised in some of the cases and mentioned briefly in court

* Professor of Law, University of Virginia. Thank you to Kristin Collins, Brandon
Garrett, Jill Hasday, and Doug NeJaime for their helpful comments and to the Association
of American Law Schools for providing a forum to present the paper.
1. See Executive Order: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the
United States (Jan. 27, 2017); and revised version (Mar. 6, 2017).
2. See, e.g., Elise Foley, Trump’s Executive Order Is Already Hurting Refugees,
Muslims, and Families, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28, 2017). http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/entry/trump-muslim-refugee-ban_us_588cb24ee4b0176377948a09 (quoting a woman
sponsoring a Syrian refugee family as saying, “Just imagining raising a child in a refugee
camp environment and then being told you could see your family again, you could be
reunited with your mom and your daughter’s grandma and being told ‘No, sorry, you’re
three days too late for that’ ― I can’t imagine what that’s like”); Amy La Porte & Azadeh
Ansari, They Were Hoping To Get to the U.S. – and then Trump Banned Them, CNN
POLITICS (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/trump-visa-ban-familiesrefugees-stories/ (relating stories of several families separated by the travel ban); Michelle
Gallardo & Eric Horng, Families Splintered, Stranded by Trump’s Immigration Order,
ABC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2017), http://abc7chicago.com/news/families-splintered-stranded-bytrumps-immigration-order/1728752/ (quoting that sister of a refugee who was detained as
saying, “This is just a nightmare I’ll wake up from, and this is not true. This is not
happening. I wish I can do that.”).
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opinions.3 The family reunification question will likely be
addressed more fully soon, either in the cases already filed or
cases brought in response to new, more carefully crafted orders.
When a court does directly address this issue, what will the
answer be? I argue that today, courts will recognize family
reunification as an interest of constitutional import, and will
balance that interest against the genuine national security
interests of the government. Understanding why this is so requires
an analysis of the shifting and complex relationship that the right
to family unity and the government’s power over immigration
have had since our nation’s founding. These two principles have
always been in conflict, but their relative strength has waxed and
waned over time. Today, our constitutional jurisprudence has
become nuanced enough that the individual rights of families can
be balanced with the interests of the state.
In this Article, I trace the history of this relationship,
exploring the major shifts and upheavals. I argue that family rights
and the federal immigration power have had three very different
relationships over time. In the first period, family rights were
robust but extraconstitutional, a bedrock assumption of how
American democracy operated. Regardless of whether the nation
was in a mode of conquest and expansion (and therefore
encouraged European migration to help “civilize” the new
nation), or in a mode of restriction (actively circumscribing
immigration), family relationships were assumed by courts,
administrators, and citizens to be important enough that they
could override the state’s interest in regulating its borders. In the
second period, which began roughly with the quota system in the
1920s and continued roughly through the 1980s, courts shifted to
conceiving family rights and the immigration power as conflicting
with one another, and when pressed they usually found that the
government’s interest in restricting immigration and protecting its
borders outweighed the interests of individual families in
reuniting. Most recently, as family law itself has become
“constitutionalized,” a new understanding is emerging, whereby
individual family members have a constitutionally protected
interest in their relationships, and the state’s national security and
border regulation interests are recognized still as significant but
3. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1166 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(noting that, even if green card holders were not covered by the executive order,
“applicants who have a relationship with a U.S. resident” might have claims to assert).
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must be balanced with these interests. This latest balancing trend
is not unique to the particular relationship between family
reunification and the immigration power, but that relationship is
an important, and underappreciated, example.4
This argument necessarily paints history with a broad brush.
It goes without saying that the trends I observe here were never
universal and always contested, as many scholars have explored
at length elsewhere.5 Today’s family law, constitutional law, and
even immigration law still contain vestiges of these other periods.6
I argue, however, that over large periods of time, we can begin to
discern changes in the tide: a change in the common
understanding of “rights” in general and “family rights” in
particular, a change in courts’ understanding of the role of the
federal government in national security and border regulation,
and a change in the relationship of individual rights to this power.
This argument proceeds as follows. Part I explores the
common law concept of “family rights” and their relation to
migration during, first, a time of expansion, and second, a time of
restriction. Part II explores the rise of what I call the “security
state,” and the use of the plenary power doctrine to bolster
congressional and executive power at the expense of family unity.
Part III examines recent United States Supreme Court cases that
call this doctrine into question, showing how, taken together, they
point to a new understanding of the balance between the
4. For a classic examination of the rise of constitutional balancing, see T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
5. See CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN (1998);
NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000);
MARTHA MABIE GARDNER, THE QUALITIES OF A CITIZEN: WOMEN, IMMIGRATION,
AND CITIZENSHIP, 1870-1965 (2005); GEORGE ANTHONY PEFFER, IF THEY DON’T BRING
THEIR WOMEN HERE: CHINESE FEMALE IMMIGRATION BEFORE EXCLUSION (1999);
Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacy of Coverture, 28 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 593 (1991); Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and
the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134 (2014); Rose
Cuison Villazor, The Other Loving: Uncovering the Federal Government’s Racial
Regulation of Marriage, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1361 (2011); Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship:
On Asian American History and the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 405 (2005).
6. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 841
(2004) (showing that family law scholars often overstate the extent to which coverture has
been “vanquished and excised from the law of marriage”); Reva B. Siegel, The
Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Women’s Wives’ Rights to Earnings,
1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2210 (showing that “when a society undertakes to
disestablish caste relations, it may instead translate them from an antiquated and therefore
socially dissonant discourse to a contemporary and socially acceptable discourse”).
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government’s interest in maintaining its borders and citizens’
interests in maintaining their families. Family reunification is a
right, but it does not outweigh legitimate national security
interests. Congress and the Executive enjoy power over
immigration, but not to the extent that they can arbitrarily ignore
family ties.
I. THE AGE OF THE UNITARY FAMILY
The text of the United States Constitution makes no mention
of family. The Bill of Rights enumerates the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, to keep and bear arms, to be secure in their
persons against unreasonable searches and seizures, and many
other specific rights, but the right to marry, the right to beget or
bear children, the right to make decisions about the welfare of
one’s child, or the right to live with a family member are nowhere
mentioned.7
Also absent from the U.S. Constitution is a general power
over immigration. True, the Migration Clause precluded
Congress from prohibiting the migration or importation of people
prior to the year 1808,8 but this clause was widely understood to
euphemistically refer to the slave trade.9 The Constitution does
grant Congress the power to “establish a uniform rule of
Naturalization” (e.g., a rule for creating new citizens)10 and with
Reconstruction came the Fourteenth Amendment, which
provided citizenship to anyone born on U.S. soil.11 A general
authority over the admission and removal of noncitizens,
however, is conspicuously absent.12
The textual absence of family and immigration from the
Constitution reflects the social and political conditions under

7. Bruce Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy:
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 473, 571 (1983).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
9. See, e.g., FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (referring to the clause as
referencing the slave trade and decrying those who would interpret it as “calculated to
prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to America”).
10. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
11. Id. amend. XIV (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside”).
12. See Sarah Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories,
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEXAS L.
REV. 1, 81 (2002).
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which it was written, and deep-seated assumptions about both
family and migration, none of which is still true today. Over the
years, courts have developed a constitutional jurisprudence of
family rights for individuals and immigration powers for the
government.
For America’s founders, and, indeed, for the first hundred
years of the country’s history, the family was a central, but
unspoken, undergirding principle of democratic theory. As Nancy
Cott has described it, the founders’ “political theory of marriage”
was “so deeply embedded in political assumptions that it was
rarely voiced as a theory”; it “occupied the place where political
theory overlapped with common sense.”13 At the center of this
theory was the notion of marital unity. The common law “turned
the married pair legally into one person—the husband.”14 Under
the doctrine of coverture, a married woman lost her ability to
manage her own property, enter into contracts, or establish an
independent domicile. A husband’s authority and responsibility
over his household also extended to his children.15 These family
structures were inflexible status relationships. As Joanna
Grossman and Lawrence Friedman have noted, “in the
nineteenth century, in general, when two people married, they
opted into a status that was clearly defined for them by law. . . .
Marriage was a public institution; the state had a heavy stake in
supporting it; and its terms were, in general, controlled by law, not
individuals.”16 These terms were deeply gendered; marriage
slotted men and women into particular roles that it was very
difficult to resist. Women who tried, like Myra Bradwell, to
fashion a different role for themselves, found that the institution
of marriage itself could prevent them from doing so. When
Bradwell sued the State of Illinois for its refusal to admit her to
the bar, the Supreme Court sided with the state. Justice Bradley
famously opined that it is a woman’s “paramount destiny and
mission to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother.”17

13. COTT, supra note 5.
14. Id. at 10.
15. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated
Law of Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299, 314–15 (2002).
16. JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW
AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 60 (2011).
17. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
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The common law understanding of family was also reflected
in citizenship law. In 1855, Congress passed a statute that granted
automatic citizenship to a woman who married a citizen, provided
she was a “free white person” as required by the naturalization
statute.18 The statute also granted citizenship to the children of
American male citizens.19 Conversely, the 1907 Expatriation Act
took away citizenship from a woman who married a foreigner.20
This statute was famously upheld in MacKenzie v. Hare, where it
was challenged by Ethel MacKenzie, a wealthy San Franciscan
who had married a British citizen but remained with him in
California. The Court justified her expatriation using the
language of coverture. “The identity of husband and wife,” it held,
“is an ancient principle of our jurisprudence.”21
In the early days of the United States, this principle of family
unity and the immigration power were rarely in tension with one
another. The overwhelming goal of the nation was to expand its
borders and settle new territory; it had not yet begun to actively
restrict immigration, with the exception of ending the slave trade
in 1808 and the Federalist Congress and President John Adams’s
attempt, through the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, to quash proFrench sentiment.22 The national government encouraged
westward migration and immigration from Europe through acts
such as the Donation Land Act and the Homestead Act.23
Sometimes these inducements mobilized the unitary family to
further the goals of settlement. The Donation Land Act, for
example, provided twice as many acres to married settlers as it did
to single ones24 with the intent to “produce a population” through
the “encouragement of the women to peril the dangers and
hardships of the journey.”25

18. Act of 1855, 10 Stat. 604 (reenacted as 1 Rev. Stat. 350, § 1994 (1878)).
19. Id.
20. Expatriation Act, ch. 2534, §§ 3–4, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228–29 (1907).
21. MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
22. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801); Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66,
1 Stat. 577; Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570; Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566
(repealed 1802).
23. Oregon Donation Act, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496 (1950), amended by Act of July 17, 1854,
ch. 84, 10 Stat. 305; Homestead Act, 12 Stat. 392, 394 (1862).
24. Oregon Donation Act, ch. 76, 9 Stat. at 497.
25. Letter from Samuel R. Thurston to the Members of the House of
Representatives, Thurston Papers, quoted in Richard H. Chused, The Oregon Donation
Act of 1850 and Nineteenth Century Federal Married Women’s Property Law, 2 LAW &
HIST. REV. 44, 58 (1984). For a more detailed analysis of the role of land acts in
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This harmony began to change in the 1870s, when Congress
passed its first exclusionary immigration statutes. At first, these
targeted Chinese immigrants.26 The Chinese had come to the
United States, like many immigrants, during the Gold Rush in the
late 1940s, and were later recruited to build the Central Pacific
Railroad.27 In 1869, the railroad was completed, and many
Chinese moved to major urban centers on the West Coast.
Simultaneously, a severe economic drought depressed wages and
led to pervasive unemployment, and many white westerners
blamed their economic troubles on the Chinese.28 Later statutes
excluded categories of people (e.g., criminals, paupers, the insane,
and those with communicable diseases) deemed undesirable
regardless of their race or national origin.29 These new restrictions
reflected a growing anxiety about the ability of the nation to
absorb people who were poor, uneducated, and members of
religious minorities (Catholics and Jews).30 In sharp contrast to
the previous decades, the broad consensus was that national
interest now lay in selectively discouraging, rather than fostering,
immigration.
The Chinese people who were denied entry or deported
under these statutes actively contested the new laws. When their
cases reached the Supreme Court, the Justices responded with
opinions justifying federal control over immigration. As there was
no direct textual support for the notion that the political branches
of the federal government had this authority, the Court looked to
structural arguments. “Jurisdiction over its own territory [to
exclude aliens] is an incident of every independent nation. It is a
part of its independence.”31 So the Court opined in Chae Chan
encouraging westward migration, see Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of
Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1353 (2009).
26. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 20, § 300B, 18 Stat. 318 (reaffirming Asian
immigrants’ ineligibility for citizenship); Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58
(1882) (repealed 1943) (suspending migration of Chinse laborers to the U.S. for a period
of ten years); Page Law, ch. 141, 19 Stat. 477 (1875) (repealed 1974) (banning the
immigration of women who had entered into contracts of “lewd and immoral purposes”
and setting forth enforcement mechanisms targeting Chinese women).
27. LUCY SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE
SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 8 (1995).
28. Id. at 9.
29. Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, §1, 26 Stat. 1084.
30. SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, STAFF REPORT (1981), cited in ALENIKOFF ET
AL, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 165 (6th ed.).
31. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889).
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Ping v. United States, where it upheld the law excluding Chinese
laborers from the country. The Court also analogized the
immigration power to other “incident[s] of sovereignty,”
including the powers to “declare war, make treaties, suppress
insurrection, repel invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure
republican governments to the States, and admit subjects of other
nations to citizenship.”32
The Court expanded on its initial holding in another case
concerning a Japanese immigrant named Nishimura Ekiu, who
claimed that she was the wife of a man already in the United
States.33 Her passport stated that she was traveling with him, but
she clearly was not. She said she planned to go to a hotel and wait
until her alleged husband met her there.34 The immigration
examiner found Ekiu excludable under an 1891 statute as “likely
to become a public charge.”35 She in turn claimed that principles
of due process required her to be granted a hearing, but the Court,
referring to the power of the “political department of the
government” over immigration, rejected her claim.36 The
following term, the Court expanded its understanding of
immigration authority still further to the deportation context,
holding that Congress’s power to “expel or deport foreigners . . .
rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified
as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the
country.”37 The notion that the political branches of the federal
government—Congress and the Executive—have exclusive
power to regulate the nation’s borders became known as the
“plenary power doctrine.”38 Importantly, this doctrine developed
long before modern equal protection doctrine had developed.39

32. Id. at 604. For a detailed account of the development of the plenary power
doctrine in Chae Chan Ping, see Cleveland, supra note 12, at 124–33.
33. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
34. Id. at 652.
35. Id. at 662. For an exploration of the case and discussion of the treatment of
unmarried women as prostitutes or paupers, see KEVIN JOHNSON, THE HUDDLED MASSES
MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 126 (2004).
36. Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659.
37. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893).
38. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547, 551–
552 (1990) (defining plenary power and identifying these cases as the origins of the
doctrine).
39. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding segregation as
consistent with equal protection principles).
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By the time Congress began actively regulating immigration
in the 1880s, the common law notion of the unitary family headed
exclusively by a husband and father had begun to unravel, at least
at the state law level. Many states had passed married women’s
property acts, which enabled wives to keep their separate
property upon marriage.40 The women’s suffrage movement was
actively advocating for a national right to vote and western states
were already beginning to allow women to vote.41 But these
changes afoot represented a slow disintegration and
transformation, not an overnight revolution.42 The common law
theory of marital unity was still so powerful that family unity was
treated with extraordinary deference—even in the face of an
articulation of the immigration power that made the state’s
authority sound absolute.
Consider, for example, the case of Chung Toy Ho and Wong
Choy Sin, the wife and child of a Chinese merchant named Wong
Ham.43 Mr. Wong was a well-known Chinese merchant living in
Portland, Oregon. Under the Chinese Exclusion Act and
subsequent statutes, Chinese laborers were excluded from entry
to the United States.44 Per treaty, some classes of Chinese people
were allowed to enter, namely “teachers, students, merchants, or
[people who proceed] from curiosity; together with their body and
household servants.”45 Those who were members of these favored
classes were required by statute to obtain a certificate from the
Chinese government stating the person was entitled by the statute
to come to the United States and granting permission to do so.46

40. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 7, 1848, ch. 200, 1848 N.Y. Laws 307 (enabling a married
woman to receive and hold to her “sole and separate use” real and personal property,
removing such property from the control of the husband and protecting it from liability for
his debts).
41. T.A. Larson, Woman Suffrage in Western America, 38 UTAH HIST. Q. 8, 19
(1970).
42. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning
Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994).
43. In re Chung Toy Ho, 42 F. 398 (C.C.D. Or. May 23, 1890).
44. Scott Act, ch. 1064, § 1, 25 Stat. 504 (1888) (repealed 1943) (restricting entry of
all Chinese laborers); Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115 (repealed 1943) (amending
and adding certificate requirement to Chinese Exclusion Act); Chinese Exclusion Act, ch.
126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943) (suspending migration of Chinse laborers to the
U.S. for a period of ten years).
45. Treaty Between the United States and China, Concerning Immigration, Nov. 17,
1880, U.S.-China, 22 Stat. 826.
46. Act of 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115.
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These statutes made no mention of wives or children. Read
literally, the statutes prohibited them from entering the United
States without a certificate, because “‘every Chinese person,’
other than a laborer,” who was entitled to come had to acquire a
certificate.47 It would have been very difficult for many of them,
including Chung Toy Ho and Wong Choy Sin, to demonstrate that
they were entering as merchants, teachers, or students; their true
purpose in entering was as the family members of a merchant.
Hearing their case, Judge Deady of the District Court of
Oregon construed the statute to allow their entry. He conceded
that they were “‘Chinese persons,’ and therefore within the letter
of the statute” but concluded that, in his judgment, “they are not
the ‘persons’ contemplated by [C]ongress in the passage of the
act.”48 “Chinese women,” he explained, “are not teachers,
students, or merchants,” so obtaining the required certificate
would be impossible. But, he continued, “as the wives and
children of ‘teachers, students, and merchants,’ they do in fact
belong to such class.”49 The judge also observed that the treaty
allowed a merchant to bring with him his “body and household
servants,” and concluded that “[i]t is impossible to believe that
parties to this treaty, which permits the servants of a merchant to
enter the country with him, ever contemplated the exclusion of his
wife and children.”50 The opinion concludes by holding that if a
Chinese merchant is entitled to enter the United States he is
therefore entitled to bring his wife and children with him. “The
company of the one, and the care and custody of the other, are his
by natural right; and he ought not to be deprived of either, unless
the intention of [C]ongress to do so is clear and unmistakable.”51
Thus, for Judge Deady, the “natural right” of a husband and
father to the “care and custody” of his wife and child had to be
considered when construing a federal statute that, on its face,
demanded an opposite result. Many other cases were litigated
during this period, some agreeing with Judge Deady’s rationale52
47. In re Chung Toy Ho, 42 F. at 399 (examining Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat.
115 (repealed 1943)).
48. Id. at 399 (interestingly, Judge Deady’s son, Paul R. Deady, represented the
Chinese petitioners in the case).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 400.
52. In re Lee Yee Sing, 85 Fed. Rep. 635 (D. Wash. 1898); United States v. Gue Lim,
83 Fed. Rep. 136 (D. Wash. 1897).
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and some rejecting it.53 In 1900, the United States Supreme Court
finally addressed the issue, and sided with Judge Deady. In United
States v. Mrs. Gue Lim, the Court that the wives and children of
Chinese merchants were entitled to enter the United States
without a certificate of their own.54 Justice Peckham, writing for
the Court, observed that a Chinese wife “may have [had] no
former, and may have no present, occupation or profession.”55 To
require her to obtain a certificate would mean that she “cannot
come into this country at all . . . . She must come in as the wife of
her domiciled husband or not at all.”56 The Court reached the
same conclusion for the children of Chinese merchants,
explaining, “They come in by reason of their relationship to the
father.”57
The cases involving Chinese women occurred within a
specific racialized context in which Congress had attempted to
severely limit Chinese migration while still leaving open the
possibility of trade between nations and the migration of Chinese
from upper classes necessary to effect that trade. These cases can
be seen as examples of how common law notions of family rights
operated to protect family unity in spite of the racialized nature
of the regulatory scheme. But principles of family unity also
operated to exclude. The “family” protected by the principle of
family unity was married and monogamous. When immigrants—
especially those who were nonwhite—did not fit this definition of
family, the principle of family unity was no help to them. In these
instances, courts questioned the legitimacy of particular family
structures, and thus made palatable the exclusion of family
members from entry or sometimes even citizenship.58
I do not want to overstate the extent to which the common
law understanding of the unitary family was a “right.” Judges such
53. In re Ah Quan, 21 Fed. Rep. 182, 186 (D. Cal. 1884); In re Ah Moy, 21 Fed. Rep.
785 (D. Cal. 1884); In re Wo Tai Li, 48 Fed. Rep. 667 (N.D. Cal. 19894); In re Lum Lin
Ying, 59 Fed. Rep. 682 (D. Or. 1894); In re Li Foon, 80 Fed. Rep. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1897).
54. United States v. Mrs. Gue Lim, 176 U.S. 459 (1900).
55. Id. at 466.
56. Id. at 468.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 5 (showing how children born abroad to U.S. citizen
fathers were denied citizenship when they were born in countries where some people
practiced polygamy or born outside of marriage); Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution,
and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641 (2005) (showing how
second-wives of Chinese immigrants were labeled “prostitutes” for immigration purposes
and therefore excluded).
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as Judge Deady may have referred to family unity as a husband
and father’s “natural right,” but this notion was substantially
different from how we understand rights today. Before the advent
of international human rights and the constitutionalization of
individual rights, natural rights were part of the fabric of society
and informed how courts and legislatures understood the scope of
their power but were not cognizable rights on their own.
Importantly, these “rights” simultaneously conferred authority on
husbands and fathers and undermined the autonomy of wives and
children. Sometimes, wives and children benefited from the
family unity principle, by obtaining access to immigration or
citizenship statuses for which they otherwise would not have been
eligible. Sometimes, however, their inability to claim family
reunification as an independent right meant that they lost their
citizenship (as in the case of women who married foreigners) or
were deprived of it in the first place (as in the case of children of
nonmarital citizen fathers). Despite these important caveats,
however, the “right” to family unity during this age was strikingly
significant—strong enough to override serious government
interests in border protection and immigration control.
II. THE AGE OF SECURITY
Chinese and Japanese exclusion paved the way for a more
wide-ranging and robust national interest in protecting its
borders. Although this interest was first framed in both statutes
and case law in racial and national origins terms, and has
maintained this inflection in some form or another through today,
it quickly expanded to a more general authority. Under this
version of the plenary power doctrine, the executive and
legislative branches of the federal government had the sole power
to make decisions regarding immigration with very little
interference from either the states or the federal judiciary.
Despite the widespread understanding that a man had the right to
the services of his wife and custody and control of his children,
over time, this right to family unity, still largely extraconstitutional in its framing, was outweighed by the plenary
power doctrine espoused by the courts.
The first hints of just how broad plenary power could become
came with the Emergency Quota Act of 1921 and the National
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Origins Act of 1924.59 Although Chinese laborers had been
excluded decades before, these acts were the first that set forth
quotas for all immigrants, regardless of their nation of origin.
These quotas were wildly different depending on the national
origin of the migrant, and were the backbone of a racist
immigration regime that persisted until Congress, urged on by
President Johnson, repealed the quota acts in 1965.60 To be sure,
the quotas privileged family members in the immigration process,
and wives had preferred status.61 For our purposes, the truly
remarkable change ushered in by these quotas was the
assumption made by Congress that it could restrict family
migration, even the migration of families who were monogamous,
Christian, and “civilized.”62
The implementation of these quotas sometimes told a
different story. Judges were reluctant to impose them, and almost
immediately began to create loopholes.63 Over time, however, the
U.S. Supreme Court bolstered the plenary power doctrine by
upholding congressional and executive action even where it was
arbitrary and even where it resulted in the tearing apart of
established families. Two cases in particular from the 1950s are
illustrative of this trend.
In Knauff v. Shaughnessy, a German-born wife of a
naturalized citizen was excluded from the U.S. without a hearing
on the ground that her admission would be “prejudicial to the
interests of the United States.”64 The government claimed
national security interests were paramount due to “the national
emergency of World War II.”65 Ms. Knauff did not make a claim
that her marriage was constitutionally protected.66 Indeed, there
59. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-130, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153.; Emergency
Quota Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5, repealed by Immigration Act of 1924,
43 Stat. 153.
60. Hart-Celler Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).
61. Kerry Abrams, What Makes the Family Special?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 12 (2012).
62. Id. at 12–14 (discussing effects of these acts on family migration).
63. See Kerry Abrams, Peaceful Penetration: Proxy Marriage, Same-Sex Marriage,
and Recognition, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 141, 156–162 (discussing judicial overriding of
1921 Quota Act for wives of immigrants who would otherwise have been excludable).
64. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 539 (1950).
65. Id. at 544.
66. Id. at 542 (discussing plaintiff’s claim that the statute in question and
accompanying regulations contained unconstitutional delegations of legislative power).
See also Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. 458, 475 (2009) (noting that in Knauff the Court found that the right to exclude
aliens “stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to
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was no constitutional protection for marriage at this time; it would
be seventeen more years before Loving v. Virginia ushered in a
new era of constitutionalized family law.67 Instead, she made a
structural constitutional claim, arguing that the regulations used
were not “reasonable” and unconstitutionally delegated
legislative power to the executive.68 The Court denied Knauff’s
claim, citing the exclusion-era cases, including Nishamura Ekiu.
“It is not within the province of any court,” it explained, “to
review the determination of the political branch . . . to exclude a
given alien.”69
Three years later in Shaughnessy v. Mezei, the Supreme
Court upheld the exclusion of another noncitizen, also the spouse
of a U.S. citizen.70 There, Mr. Mezei, a resident of the United
States, had left to visit his dying mother in Romania.71 He was
denied permission to enter, and was delayed for nineteen months
while he tried to get exit papers to leave Hungary.72 When he
attempted to reenter the U.S., he was detained on Ellis Island.
Because no other country would take him, unlike Ellen Knauff,
he could not leave Ellis Island.73 In Mezei, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its holding in Knauff, finding that “[w]hatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process”—even if
the process was no process at all.74 This stunning articulation of
plenary power as absolute control over borders arguably marks
the height of the doctrine. Mezei’s nascent family reunification
claim (his wife was living in upstate New York and he was
attempting to return to the United States after living there for
years) is not even mentioned by the dissent in that case.
Even at the height of plenary power, however, the idea of
family rights still held a cherished place in the popular
imagination. Both Knauff and Mezei provoked controversy.
Congress held hearings in which Ellen Knauff testified and was
control the foreign affairs of the nation” and characterizing this holding as “in tension with
conventional understandings of separation of powers”).
67. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
68. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
69. 338 U.S. at 543.
70. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 217 (1953) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “he wanted to go to his wife and home in Buffalo”).
71. Id. at 208 (majority opinion).
72. Id.
73. Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the
Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 935, 965–66 (1995).
74. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212.
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ultimately granted a full exclusion hearing by the Bureau of
Special Inquiry, and an appeal to the Board of Immigration
Appeals—exactly what she had asked for in her Supreme Court
case.75 The hearings revealed that the government had relied on
hearsay and misinformation in reaching its conclusion that Knauff
was engaged in espionage. The Board ordered that she be
admitted to the U.S. as a permanent resident. She later sought
U.S. citizenship, which the government also fought, and rather
than continue litigating the issue, she lived out her days a
permanent resident, but not a citizen, of the United States.76
Mezei was less successful but was also ultimately released. He had
been convicted of possessing stolen goods (sacks of flour during
the Great Depression), which was a “crime of moral turpitude,” a
ground for exclusion, and had attended meetings with
communists.77 But his lawyer made a good case that he did not
deserve to live out his life a prisoner on Ellis Island, and the
Attorney General paroled him into the United States.78
If Mezei and Knauff show the importance of the Cold War
and national security to bolstering the plenary power doctrine,
Lutwak v. United States shows how changing notions of family
weakened the family unity principle.79 Lutwak, decided in the
same term as Mezei, involved several United States citizens who
married Polish concentration camp survivors in an attempt to get
them legal immigration status under the War Brides Act.80
Lutwak posed a problem for the Court: the marriages might well
be valid under a formal family law test, yet they seemed to be
intended to circumvent immigration law.81 The conspirators had
been indicted for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud, but only
two of the three couples were convicted.82 One of the defendants
was acquitted, most likely because he and his new wife began
cohabiting after he was indicted, calling into question—at least for

75. Weisselberg, supra note 73, at 961–64 (1995).
76. Id. at 964 n.165.
77. Id. at 976–83.
78. Id. at 984.
79. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
80. See War Brides Act of Dec. 28, 1945, Pub. L. 271, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659 (1945). See
also ARISTIDE ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN 304–305 (2006) (outlining history of the
United States’ refusal to provide refuge to displaced persons after World War II).
81. Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 609–10.
82. Id. at 605.
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the jury—whether their marriage was really a “sham.”83 They
apparently expressed the wish, at trial, to remain married to each
other.84
The marital unity principle had assumed that marriage was a
hierarchical status relationship that produced gendered citizens.
Importantly, marriage was the only legal space for sexual
relations,85 and despite the fact that spouses did sometimes
divorce or separate, it was also understood to be permanent.86 But
in the twentieth century, this common understanding slowly
changed. Marriage began to be understood as an expression of
self-authorship, reflecting a person’s individuality rather than
conformity.87 The rigid gender roles assigned to spouses were
undermined, both by behavior and through law. This notion,
however, had not yet calcified into a constitutional right. Instead,
at this point in time, marriage as self-expression was a threatening
idea, because it gave control to spouses to define what it meant
for them, rather than what it contributed to society. Instead of
being the bedrock of a defined social structure, marriage could be
used to undermine these very structures.
This tension can be seen in the Court’s approach to affirming
the Lutwak defendants’ guilt. At the time Lutwak was decided,
the only existing doctrine available for determining questions of
marriage fraud was the “essentials of the marriage” test from
annulment law.88 This test required that one party to the marriage
seek an annulment based on his or her spouse’s premarital
misrepresentations about his or her willingness to engage in
sexual activity or procreation.89 That test didn’t fit well on
Lutwak’s facts: none of the conspirators had been duped into

83. See Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer
Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 669, 706 (1997) (arguing that a
“fair construction of the acquittal is that the jury must have been convinced by the evidence
presented that the marriage, regardless of the intent of the parties at the time they married,
had become, by the time of the trial, a ‘valid’ marriage”).
84. See Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 621 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting that at trial the
parties expressed their desire to stay married and were acquitted).
85. Anne Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 21–25 (1998).
86. For a history of spousal separation, see HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN
AMERICA (2000).
87. See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, A Right Not To Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
1509, 1530–33 (2016).
88. For an extended analysis of the “essentials” test, see Kerry Abrams, The End of
Annulment, 16 J. GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 681 (2013).
89. Id. at 686.

ABRAMS_DRAFT 6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

FAMILY REUNIFICATION

7/6/17 5:35 PM

263

thinking that any of these marriages were about anything other
than getting refugees safely out of Europe. The only other
available doctrine was the slim line of cases holding that a
marriage made in jest was not a valid marriage.90 Indeed, in its
opinion upholding the jury verdicts against the convicted
conspirators, the Seventh Circuit made a somewhat ham-handed
attempt at using the “jest” exception to describe the Lutwak
facts.91 It was not only marriages made in jest that were void,
according to that court, but also marriages in which the parties did
not “assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood,
and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a preten[s]e, or
cover, to deceive others.”92 Of course, this statement was not true:
“shotgun” weddings and other marriages for a particular purpose
were marriages designed precisely to “cover or deceive others,”93
and there was nothing invalid about these; in fact, marriage was
often the “punishment” for the crime of seduction in nineteenthcentury family law.94
The Supreme Court upheld the Seventh Circuit’s decision,
but not on the theory the lower court had used. Understanding
that annulment doctrine was inapposite to the facts at hand, the
Court declared the actual legal validity of the marriages
immaterial to the question of fraud. “No one is being prosecuted
for an offense against the marital relation,” Justice Minton
explained.95 Instead, the offense was that the parties had used the
institution of marriage in order to gain a benefit they did not
deserve.96 The marriages themselves might be legally valid, but
that would not stop the government from prosecuting the parties
for immigration fraud. The government did not need to defer to
the individuals’ understanding of what their marriage meant to
them. Instead, it could impose its own view of what marriage was
supposed to mean and deny the couple the benefits of marital
status if they were found wanting. As the Court put it in Lutwak,

90. For a discussion of the jest exception, see Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100
CAL. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012).
91. See United States v. Lutwak, 195 F. 2d 748 (7th Cir. 1952).
92. Id. at 753–54. See also Rubenstein v. United States, 151 F. 2d 915, 918–19 (1945)
(making the same claim).
93. See Abrams, supra note 90, at 12.
94. Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24 (2012). See
also Abrams, supra note 90, at 12 (discussing “limited purpose” marriages).
95. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 611 (1953).
96. Id.
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“the common understanding of a marriage, which Congress must
have had in mind when it made provision for ‘alien spouses’ in the
War Brides Act, is that the two parties have undertaken to
establish a life together and assume certain duties and
obligations.”97
Taken together, Knauff, Mezei, and Lutwak represent a shift
in the interaction of family rights and immigration power. These
cases, occurring after the trauma of World War II and the
beginnings of the Cold War, were decided in a context of high
anxiety over borders and infiltration. A spouse might not be just
a spouse but a spy. At the same time, the meaning of marriage was
shifting. Divorce was increasingly available, and, toward the end
of this period, nonmarital births increased. Marriage was
becoming more individualistic and less central to the social order.
Indeed, we can see in the Knauff, Mezei, and Lutwak
dissents, all written by Justice Jackson, the seeds of a new
understanding of both family rights and immigration power. In his
Knauff dissent, Justice Jackson articulated a family reunification
rationale for Knauff’s claims. Congress, he argued, has the power
to exclude aliens. But it did not have the power to authorize “an
abrupt and brutal exclusion of the wife of an American citizen
without a hearing.”98 Justice Jackson painted a stark picture of the
injustice he saw in the government’s treatment of the Knauffs—
”Now this American citizen is told he cannot bring his wife to the
United States, but he will not be told why,”—and the
consequences of this treatment—”He must abandon his bride to
live in his own country or forsake his country to live with his
bride.”99 Regarding the claim that national security was at stake,
Justice Jackson expressed skepticism.
Security is like liberty, in that many crimes are committed in its
name. The menace to the security of this country, be it great as
it may, from this girl’s admission is as nothing compared to the
menace to free institutions inherent in the procedures of this
pattern. . . .
...

97. Id. at 611.
98. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 550 (1950) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 550–51.
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I should direct the Attorney General either to produce his
evidence justifying exclusion or to admit Mrs. Knauff to the
country.100

Similarly, in Lutwak, Justice Jackson worried about the
effects of creating a new class of crimes based on marriage. How
could it be a criminal act, he queried, to enter into a legally valid
marriage?101 If anyone had standing to contest the validity of the
marriage, it was the spouses, because a fraudulent marriage,
unlike a bigamous or incestuous marriage, is voidable, not void.102
The fact, he remarked, that the couple who had decided to stay
together had been acquitted, and “no one contends that their
marriage is void,” further supported the idea that it was up to the
spouses, not the government, to determine whether the marriages
were valid.103 Wouldn’t these parties be just as subject to
prosecution if they held themselves out as single, since they had
been married in what appeared to be valid ceremonies?104
III. THE AGE OF BALANCING
We now come to our third, and final, age, one that I have
termed the “age of balancing.” In contrast to the approaches in
the two earlier ages, courts today recognize the importance of
family ties and even recognize them as a constitutional liberty
interest, while simultaneously recognizing the importance of
national security interests. This recognition is beginning to lead to
a more nuanced analysis in specific cases, with an understanding
that even a right as important as family unity can be overridden
by security concerns but that the bald claim of “national security”
without more does not automatically override family interests.
In the last twenty years, two major shifts have occurred which
have further reworked the balance between individual family
rights and the federal immigration power. First, family rights have
become constitutionalized. Second, the Supreme Court has
expressed increasing skepticism that plenary power over
immigration means that courts have no role whatsoever to play in
evaluating the constitutionality of immigration law and
100. Id. at 551–52.
101. Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 620 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 621.
103. Id.
104. Id. A married person could be prosecuted if he held himself out as single if, for
example, he tried to marry another, violating the criminal bigamy statutes.
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enforcement. Together, these two trends have put family rights in
a stronger position than they were mid-century. To be sure, family
rights never absolutely outweigh immigration concerns today, and
there has yet to be a case that expressly constitutionalizes the right
to family reunification in the United States. The Court, however,
has indicated in multiple recent cases that the interest in family
reunification is an important factor in constitutional adjudication.
In other words, rather than assuming that the immigration power
always outweighs family rights or that family rights outweigh the
immigration power, the Court balances the interests of individuals
with the interests of the state.
A. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FAMILY RIGHTS
As with many other areas of law, the twentieth century
introduced a new attention to individual rights in family law.105
This transformation did not occur overnight. It began with the
parental rights cases of the 1920s,106 but did not fully develop until
mid-century, when these rights were further entrenched and
expanded.107 Beginning in the 1960s, the Warren Court, in the
words of Professor David Meyer, “ushered in a dramatically
different understanding of the relationship between family law
and the Constitution.”108 The application of the Fourteenth
105. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW,
AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 88–89 (1989).
106. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (affirming lower court’s
decision to enjoin enforcement of the Oregon Compulsory Education Act because it
“unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(holding it unconstitutional to prohibit teaching in languages other than English until the
student passes the eighth grade). The Court recognizes the right to “establish a home and
bring up children” as one which “may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting
the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation
to some [state] purpose.” Id. at 399–400.
107. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846–47
(1977) (“Whatever liberty interest might otherwise exist in the foster family as an
institution, that interest must be substantially attenuated where the proposed removal
from the foster family is to return the child to his natural parents.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that it was unconstitutional to compel Amish parents to send
their children to high school until the age of 16 under Wisconsin’s compulsory education
law, due to parental interest in raising their children in accordance with their religious
beliefs); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (holding that while the rights of
parents are not beyond limitation, “[i]t is cardinal with [the Court] that the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents . . . [in a] private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter”).
108. David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529, 533
(2008).
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Amendment values of liberty and equality to a variety of family
law issues led to constitutional decisions “declaring a fundamental
right to marry, ensuring access to divorce, curbing discrimination
based on sex and illegitimacy, and recognizing new rights for
children and unwed fathers.”109 Marriage, thought one hundred
years ago to be a “public institution,” now took on another
dimension, a right that could be articulated by an individual
person.110 And parental rights also took on constitutional stature,
to the point where statutes that offered visitation even to
grandparents could be struck down as infringing on a parent’s
right to care, custody, and control of his or her children.111
Professor Meyer has observed that nearly all of these cases
sounded in one or both of two registers: equality or autonomy.112
Each of these concepts would have seemed inapposite in the
family context to the courts of the nineteenth century. Consider
again, for example, Myra Bradwell’s claim, referenced earlier,
that she should be admitted to the Illinois bar.113 The notion that
men and women were similarly situated and should be treated
equally received no traction with the Court, nor did the notion
that she was an autonomous individual with the right to pursue a
profession regardless of her sex or marital status.114 In contrast,
constitutionalized family rights have focused on the individual’s
ability to operate autonomously and free from discrimination.
Whether the issue is the right to marry, the right to the care,
custody, and control of one’s children, or the right of access to

109. Id. at 529.
110. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
111. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72–73 (2000) (holding that “the Due Process
Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make
childrearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be
made”).
112. Meyer, supra note 108, at 533–34.
113. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
114. It is notable that Bradwell’s claim was brought under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, which some hoped would become a vehicle for the incorporation of
common law property and contract rights into constitutional rights. See Rebecca E.
Zeitlow, Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham’s Theory of
Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717, 747 (2003) (discussing the Slaughterhouse Cases). Like
the claimants in the Slaughterhouse Cases, Bradwell claimed that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause required the federal government to protect her fundamental rights. See
Bradwell, 530 U.S. at 137. Her claim, however, was radical for the time as women lost their
contract and property rights upon marriage. See id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
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divorce, the focus is on the individual’s choice, rather than the
rights that accompany occupying a place in a status hierarchy.115
Constitutional family rights have had some curious features.
In particular, they have been marked by a vagueness, both about
the source of the right and its scope, unusual for constitutional
law. Although this feature has sometimes been critiqued as a
symptom of doctrinal confusion or even as evidence that
constitutional family rights are invented or meritless, Professor
Meyer suggests an alternative reading. Family rights are more
difficult than some others to understand as individual rights
claims because the state interest often stands in for the
unrepresented interests of nonparties, for example, children,
fetuses, co-parents, or ex-spouses.116 As Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor observed, in families, “the rights of individuals are
intertwined, and the family itself has a collective personality.”117
Thus, according to Professor Meyer, we see the Court “eschewing
strict scrutiny’s focus on compelling interests and narrow tailoring
for far more indeterminate, intermediate interest-balancing.”118
The result is a constitutionalized family law, but one in which
balancing tests and fuzzy standards, rather than rigid rules, are the
norm.119
Our most recent example of the constitutionalization of
family law is the Court’s 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.120
There, the Court struck down state statutes banning same-sex
marriage, using the equality and autonomy principles shared by
the other constitutional family cases. The majority opinion
authored by Justice Kennedy, in fact, emphasizes the autonomy
principle to a remarkable degree (“personal choice regarding

115. To be sure, gendered notions of the appropriate sphere for women did not end
with Bradwell. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (holding that since the
profession of bartending could potentially lead to moral and social problems for women,
it was within the state’s power to bar a woman from working as a bartender unless the bar
was owned by her husband or father).
116. Meyer, supra note 108, at 531.
117. Sandra Day O’Connor, The Supreme Court and the Family, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
573, 576 (2001).
118. Meyer, supra note 108, at 568.
119. Id. at 531 (noting that “as courts broaden the circle of constitutional protection
and undertake to mediate the sometimes conflicting interests of an expanding pool of
rights-holders, they will increasingly find themselves engaging in flexible, fact-sensitive
interest-balancing of a sort that fundamentally recalls ‘pre-constitutional’ family law”).
120. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy”)121
while simultaneously invoking the common law understanding of
the purpose of the family (“this Court’s cases and the Nation’s
traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of the Nation’s
social order”).122
Constitutionalized family law, then, gives individuals rights
vis-à-vis other individuals. These rights are often articulated as
rights to access (access to marriage, access to divorce, access to
parentage, access to custody—even access to abortion). The rights
are conferred not based on membership in a status group
(husbands, parents, “free white persons,” but instead because of
one’s personhood, in Obergefell’s terms, “dignity”). But these
rights, while more focused on the individual and more broadly
applicable than common law family rights, are ripe for balancing
against other interests.
B.

THE SOFTENING OF PLENARY POWER

Simultaneous with the constitutionalization of family law has
been the softening of the rigid plenary power doctrine of midcentury. To be sure, the concept of plenary power still operates in
immigration law. But it has weakened from the 1950s, when the
Knauff and Mezei Courts could unselfconsciously hold that
“[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due
process.”123
Several factors contributed to the softening of plenary power.
Especially crucial was the Court’s 1976 decision in Mathews v.
Eldridge that articulated a new test for determining whether
procedural due process had been given. Mathews essentially
requires a court to balance three issues—the importance of the
private interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest
if the government’s proposed procedures are used, and the
government’s interest.124 The Mathews test opened up a new
constitutional space in which an individual’s fundamental right
was not a trump card, but instead a factor to be considered in light
of government interests in regulation.

121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 2589.
Id. at 2590.
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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After Mathews, some legal scholars were concerned that the
doctrine would undermine fundamental rights. Rights that had
seemed absolute could now be balanced against the government’s
interest in curtailing them, such that “balancing [could] lead to the
anomalous result that an individual will have a clear due process
right to no process.”125 In immigration law, however, where the
norm was “no process,” the Mathews test offered a new hope. The
application of Mathews to the immigration context was obvious:
in almost any immigration dispute, an individual’s interest in
entering or remaining in the country conflicted with the
government’s interest in efficient exclusion or removal. In 1982,
the Court adopted the new balancing approach in Landon v.
Plasencia, where it applied the Mathews test to hold that a
permanent resident who transported aliens illegally across the
border had not received adequate due process at her exclusion
hearing.126 But the Plasencia Court stopped short of overruling
Knauff, a failure that did not go unnoticed. Professor Gerald
Neuman wrote that the Plasencia Court “recognized the weighty
interest of a lawful permanent resident in remaining in the United
States, but it also emphasized the weighty interest of the
government in efficient administration of the immigration laws”
and concluded, “[w]ith that alternative analysis available, the
Knauff doctrine is not only brutal, but unnecessary.”127
Even in instances where the Court did not explicitly adopt
the Mathews test, it did begin to find ways to adjudicate
immigration cases without overruling the plenary power doctrine
head-on. In many cases it interpreted statutes using what
Professor Hiroshi Motomura termed “phantom constitutional
norms,” thus avoiding the plenary power doctrine but upholding
the rights of immigrants.128 Consider, for example, Zadvydas v.
Davis, a case in which the Court held that an alien could not be
detained indefinitely if unlikely to be removed in the foreseeable

125. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 472 (1986).
126. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
127. Gerald. L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of
Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 1053 (1998).
128. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549–60
(1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court has undermined the plenary power doctrine by
rendering “subconstitutional” decisions in statutory interpretation cases).
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future.129 On its face, the text of the statute in question did not
provide a time limit for detention. Rather than strike down the
statute as unconstitutional, Justice Breyer, read into the statute a
six-month limit on detention.130 In doing so, he referenced the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance: “when an Act of Congress
raises ‘a serious doubt’ as to its constitutionality, ‘this Court will
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided.’”131
The Zadvydas majority also made another important move
that distinguishes that case from Knauff, Mezei, and other early
plenary power cases. The majority did not treat the political
branches’ authority over immigration as monolithic but instead as
closely linked to foreign affairs and national security interests.
Thus, rather than simply defer because the subject of
“immigration” was at issue, the Court examined the foreign
affairs or national security issue at play in the case and considered
it in light of the individual’s liberty interest in not be indefinitely
detained. In Zadvydas, the legitimate government foreign policy
interest was in the “‘sensitive’ repatriation negotiations” in which
the executive branch might be engaged with countries that might
agree to repatriate the detained aliens.132 The Court found no
evidence that a habeas court’s hearing a claim of unlawful
indefinite detention would harm these negotiations.133
Plenary power is still very much alive. Courts give much
greater deference to the executive and legislative branches in
cases involving immigration, especially in cases involving
immigrants who are outside the country or who have not yet been
granted lawful permanent residency. But the shifts that have
occurred in the last fifty years have made the doctrine more
malleable and nuanced. Courts are now able to consider both the
strength of the individual rights claim made by a citizen or

129. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (reading statute to forbid indefinite
detention of aliens who are unlikely to be removed in the foreseeable future).
130. Id. at 701.
131. Id. at 689 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)). Justice Breyer chose six
months as the time limit because Congress had assumed in a previous statement that a
lesser time might be unconstitutional. We do have reason to believe, however, that
Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six months.
Zadvydas at 701 (citing Juris. Statement of United States in United States v. Witkovich, O.
T. 1956, No. 295, pp. 8–9).
132. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696.
133. Id. at 696.

ABRAMS_DRAFT 6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

272

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

7/6/17 5:35 PM

[Vol. 32:247

immigrant and to interrogate with specificity the government
interest asserted. This approach leads to a balancing of interests
rather than a rigid rule of deference to the political branches.
C.

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND MODIFIED PLENARY POWER

So, what happens today when individuals make family
reunification claims and Congress or the executive counters with
a demand that courts defer to its immigration power? In order to
see the difference between the new “age of balancing” and the
“age of the security state,” let us examine the cases from the 1970s
until today that have pitted family rights against immigration
authority.
Our story begins with Fiallo v. Bell, a 1977 case in which three
sets of fathers and their nonmarital children brought equal
protection challenges to provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) defining the words “parent” and “child”
for immigration purposes.134 Under the statute as then-written,
these fathers did not quality as “parents” and their sons did not
qualify as “children” because the fathers had not formally
legitimated them. Had the American citizen or resident parents
been mothers, not fathers, the relationships would have been
recognized for immigration purposes. Fiallo was argued during
the heyday of equal protection challenges of both gendered
statutes and statutes discriminating on the basis of “illegitimacy.”
The statute in question in Fiallo did both at once.135 Despite its
rejection of statutes discriminating on the basis of gender or
illegitimacy in other contexts and its application of an emerging
standard of “intermediate scrutiny” in those instances, the Fiallo
court refused to apply heightened scrutiny in the immigration
context. Instead, it held that even though
it could be argued that the line should have been drawn at a
different point and that the statutory definitions deny
preferential status to parents and children who share strong
family ties . . . it is clear from our cases . . . that these are policy
questions entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our
Government, and we have no judicial authority to substitute
our political judgment for that of the Congress.136

134. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
135. Id. at 794 (citing petitioners’ argument that the discrimination against them was
“double-barreled” discrimination).
136. Id. at 798.
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Fiallo appears at first glance to be a simple affirmation of the
plenary power doctrine in the extreme form in which it appeared
in Knauff and Mezei. But a closer reading reveals a crack in the
doctrine. Replying to dissenting Justice Marshall’s argument that
Fiallo required heightened scrutiny because it involved claims
made by American citizens, Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, cited Kleindeinst v. Mandel, a 1972 case in which
American professors claimed a First Amendment associational
right to meet with a visiting scholar in person on U.S. soil. In
denying this claim, the Court held that
when the Executive exercises this [delegated] power negatively
on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the
courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion,
nor test it by balancing its justification against the First
Amendment interests of those who seek personal
communication with the applicant” . . . [w]e can see no reason
to review the broad congressional policy choice at issue here
under a more exacting standard.137

In other words, under Mandel and Fiallo, the Court does not
give exacting scrutiny or engage in direct balancing between the
individual interest and the government interest. Instead, the
government gets the first crack at framing its decision to exclude
an immigrant as “facially legitimate and bona fide,” and once it
has done so, the individual does not have an opportunity to claim
discrimination.
This articulation of the plenary power doctrine, while still
affording great deference to Congress, differs significantly from
that set forth in Knauff and Mezei. There, that “[w]hatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process.”138 Here,
the alleged purpose of the law had to be based on a “facially
legitimate and bona fide reason,” potentially opening the door for
the striking down of statutes not based on “facially legitimate” or
“bona fide” reasons. Gerald Neuman interpreted this language as
“roughly equivalent to the rational basis test”—surely a step up
from no scrutiny at all.139 This version of plenary power also puts
Congress above the executive in importance, treating the
executive’s power over immigration as “delegated” from
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 794–95 (citing Kleindeinst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972)).
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1839 n.31 (1993).
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Congress rather than independently held. Indeed, in the years
since Mandel and Fiallo, the rational basis test itself has become
much more capable of invalidating statutes than it used to be. In
cases such as Romer v. Evans and United States v. Windsor, the
Court invalidated statutes because they were animated by a “bare
desire to harm” individual people.140 If Fiallo stands for the
principle that, in the immigration context, discrimination claims
get rational basis review, Romer and Windsor show us that
rational basis review is not a green light for the statute’s
constitutionality.
Despite its nuancing of the plenary power doctrine, Fiallo
usually has been interpreted as supporting plenary power
principles.141 None of the families who brought claims in the case
prevailed. This was a disappointing result for those who wanted
the courts to be robust defenders of equal protection. The Court’s
opinion was also disappointing to those who had hoped that the
claim of constitutional family rights could outweigh the political
branches’ immigration authority.142
By the time the Court again considered sections of the INA
that discriminated based on gender and illegitimacy, however, the
constitutional architecture of gender discrimination claims was
more firmly fixed. In Nguyen v. INS, the majority opinion was
able to state with confidence that “in order to pass constitutional
muster, the statutory provision must be substantially related to
the achievement of important governmental objectives”—the
now-standard “intermediate scrutiny” test.143 Nguyen involved
140. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down Defense of
Marriage Act and finding evidence of a “bare desire to harm” gay and lesbian couples in
the legislative history of the act); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down
Colorado Constitutional Amendment 2, which banned the state and its municipalities from
treating sexual orientation as a protected class and holding that the law in question’s “sheer
breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational
relationship to legitimate state interests”).
141. See, e.g., Kristin A. Collins, Deference and Deferral: Constitutional Structure and
the Durability of Gender-Based Nationality Laws, in THE PUBLIC LAW OF GENDER 73, 73–
98, 77 (Kim Rubenstein & Katharine G. Young eds., 2016) (describing Fiallo as “an
important plenary power case” and examining the relationship between the Court’s
decision and subsequent Congressional action).
142. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J.
624, 649 n.123 (1980) (describing Fiallo as “[a] case in which the Court got this subject all
wrong”).
143. In Nguyen v. INS, the majority was able to state with confidence that “[f]or a
gender-based classification to withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established
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the provision in the INA that required legitimation or other
stringent proofs of paternity in order for fathers to transmit
citizenship to their nonmarital children born abroad without
similar requirements for citizenship transmittal by U.S. mothers
to their foreign-born, nonmarital children. The majority found
that the differential treatment of fathers and mothers in the
statute passed intermediate scrutiny because of the biological
differences between men and women: “in the case of the mother,
the relation is verifiable from the birth itself” but in the “case of
the father, the uncontestable fact is that he need not be present at
the birth” and could therefore be required to demonstrate
fatherhood through other means.144
Although Nguyen was a blow to advocates of gender
equality, it may have represented yet another chink in the armor
of plenary power. Rather than invoke the doctrine, the Court
chose to treat the claim as a straight-up gender discrimination
claim, and applied intermediate scrutiny with no mention of
giving deference to a “facially legitimate” or “bona fide” reason
as in Fiallo. The reasons for this were not clear. It is possible that
the Court did not believe that the plenary power doctrine applied
to a case concerning citizenship, rather than immigration. But it is
also possible that the Court did not believe it appropriate to apply
plenary power principles to a case involving family relationships
that bore such a tenuous relationship to national security.145
More recently, additional evidence has mounted that the
Supreme Court no longer views plenary power as a doctrine that
always trumps family claims. In 2010, it heard the case of FloresVillar v. United States, another challenge to the INA’s derivative
citizenship provisions.146 In this case, which concerned differential
residency requirements for nonmarital fathers and nonmarital
mothers, it was much more difficult for the government to assert

at least that the [challenged] classification” serves important governmental objectives and
that the discriminatory means employed are “substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives.” Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
144. Id. at 62.
145. For a version of this argument, see Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the
Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1708 (2007) (urging courts to consider
“whether the immigration provision in question is advancing core immigration policy goals
or instead has ventured outside these goals into an area that has traditionally been within
the province of the states”).
146. Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011).
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a biological difference between men and women that would
survive intermediate scrutiny. Why would U.S. citizen mothers be
more likely to be loyal to the United States after one year of
residence than U.S. citizen fathers? The court, absent Justice
Kagan who recused herself based on her previous involvement in
the case, split 4-4 and issued a per curiam affirmation of the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion with no opinion. Although this decision meant
that the law did not change, it was a hint that at least four
members of the Court—likely including Justice Kennedy, the
author of Nguyen—believed neither that the statute was justified
under intermediate scrutiny nor that the case required the
expansive discretion afforded under the plenary power doctrine.
As Kevin Johnson put it soon afterward: “A near-majority of the
Court, which would likely have been a majority if Justice Kagan
had not recused herself, appeared to be ready to limit, if not
eliminate, the scope of the doctrine.”147
This development came to fruition in 2017, when the Court
issued its opinion in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, a case that was
factually very similar to Flores-Villar and one that challenges the
differential residency requirements for men and women.148 At
oral argument, the Justices seemed uninterested in hearing
plenary power arguments; the government’s attorney attempted
twice to frame the case as one about “Congress’s plenary
authority” but the Justices quickly turned the conversation to
scrutiny of the government’s stated interests in the case and
whether gender or illegitimacy discrimination existed.149 In her
majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg adopted this approach.
Applying the intermediate scrutiny standard usually employed in
gender discrimination cases, the Court struck down what it
characterized as a “stunningly anachronistic law.”150
Nguyen, Flores-Villar, and Morales-Santana, of course, are all
cases about derivative citizenship, not about immigration.
Although derivative citizenship and immigration cases flow from
the same statute, the Immigration and Nationality Act, there is an
argument that derivative citizenship cases are simply not subject
147. Kevin Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009-2013: A New Era of
Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 78 (2015).
148. Sessions, Attorney General v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191 (U.S. June 12,
2017).
149. Oral Argument, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, (U.S. No. 15-1191) https://www.
oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1191.
150. Morales-Santana, slip op. at 14.
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to the plenary power doctrine, because they concern a person’s
identity at birth, not their desirability as an immigrant. Individuals
born on American soil are similarly citizens under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and the political branches
of the federal government have no authority to divest them of
citizenship based on national security or foreign affairs concerns.
Derivative citizens are arguably similar—members of our
community whether the government likes it or not. (A potential
counterargument is that, absent statute, they would not be citizens
at all, and the statute must come from Congress.) So, assuming for
the moment that we can discount the holdings in Nguyen and
Flores-Villar and the prospective holding in Morales-Santana,
where do Knauff, Mezei, and Fiallo stand today? The answer is
that, although they have not been directly overruled, they have
been substantially undermined through the general softening of
the plenary power doctrine as discussed above, and in particular
through the Court’s holding in Kerry v. Din, a 2015 case in which
the Court considered a family reunification case brought by a U.S.
citizen woman.
In Din, Fauzia Din, a naturalized U.S. citizen who had come
to the United States as a refugee from Afghanistan, petitioned for
a visa for her husband, Kanishka Berashk.151 His visa was denied,
and the only reason given was reference to the page and a halflong anti-terrorism provision of the INA, a broad provision of the
statute that makes a person inadmissible for engaging in activities
ranging from blowing up a plane to lending money to someone
who is engaged in terrorist activities. With no way to know what
facts (true or false) were the basis of the denial, Din sued for a
better explanation. Her request was not that Berashk be admitted
but that she receive a better explanation than she had been given,
presumably so that she could marshal a rebuttal if the government
had been misinformed.
First, the bad news for Din: she lost. Five Justices upheld the
government’s decision to give her only the information that her
husband was denied admission based on the anti-terrorism
statute. Justice Scalia wrote a plurality opinion, but garnered only
two votes in addition to his own. He argued that a spousal
reunification claim could never be brought successfully under the
Due Process Clause, regardless of whether terrorism was at
151.

135 S. Ct. 2128, 2129.
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issue.152 Justice Breyer, joined by three other Justices, dissented.
He would have required the Court to apply the Mathews v.
Eldridge balancing test and consider her request in light of
government interests.153
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito, concurred.
Kennedy’s concurrence invokes the same language from Mandel
relied upon in Fiallo but with an important addition. Once the
government has offered a “facially legitimate and bona fide
reason” for its decision, the opinion explains, “‘courts will neither
look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing
its justification against’ the constitutional interests of citizens the
visa denial might implicate.”154 At first glance, this simply sounds
like Fiallo redux. But then Justice Kennedy adds an important
caveat: “This reasoning has particular force in the area of national
security, for which Congress has provided specific statutory
directions pertaining to visa applications by noncitizens who seek
entry to this country.”155 Every other inadmissibility provision in
the INA, he notes, requires the government to indicate the
“specific provision or provisions of law under which the alien is
inadmissible,” unless the visa application is denied due to national
security or terrorism concerns.156 Justice Kennedy’s opinion, while
rejecting the application of a balancing test by the Court in this
instance, ratifies the balancing already done in the creation of the
statute by Congress—providing more individual process where
national security interests are less prominent—and implies that
the Court might not be so deferential in a case not so closely
linked to national security.157
So what are we to make of Din? Some scholars have seen the
case as a reaffirmation of the plenary power doctrine.158 Others
have argued that, although it did not “kill” plenary power, it dealt
152. Justice Scalia was consistent across cases in his insistence that there is no
constitutional right to the protection of the family. I explore his jurisprudence in more
depth in Kerry Abrams, The Rights of Marriage: Obergefell, Din, and the Future of
Constitutional Family Law, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
153. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2145 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 2140.
156. Id. at 2141 (citing 8 U.S.C. §1182(b)(1) and (3)).
157. Justice Kennedy specifically mentions that Din “admits in her Complaint that
Berashk worked for the Taliban government” and argued that this fact “provides at least
a facial connection to terrorist activity.” Id. at 2141.
158. See David A. Martin, Why the Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L.
REV. 29 (2015).
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it an important blow. Michael Kagan, for example, has argued
that “Din’s defeat shows that plenary power is not dead yet. But
Din came very close, winning four justices.”159 He points out as
well that Justice Scalia and the two who joined him avoided
discussing plenary power at all, instead attacking substantive due
process (also perhaps this was to bolster their dissents in the
Obergefell opinion, which came down eleven days later). Perhaps
most important, however, is Justice Kennedy’s willingness in his
concurrence to assume, for the sake of argument, that Din did
have a due process interest in her relationship with her spouse.160
Given his majority opinion in Obergefell, which he was
presumably drafting simultaneously with his concurrence in Din,
it would have been difficult to contend that an American citizen
had no constitutional interest in her own marriage. The question,
given the constitutional liberty interest enjoyed by Obergefell,
Din, or anyone, then became not whether Din had such an
interest, but how it would be balanced against the national
security interests asserted by the government. For the time being,
in this particular context of alleged terrorist activity, the result of
the fractured opinions in Din is that the political branches
continue to be allowed to engage in that balancing internally. But
the implication of Kennedy’s Din concurrence is that if the
political branches stray too far from their national security
interests, the Court will interfere.
CONCLUSION
Scholars have been predicting the end of plenary power for
decades.161 Around 2000, an avalanche of scholars insinuated that
the plenary power doctrine was near its demise.162 But, as Kevin
Johnson has observed, after the attacks of September 11, 2001,
Congress imposed “special registration” on Muslims.163 Similarly,
just after his inauguration as our forty-fifth president, Donald J.
159. Michael Kagan, Plenary Power is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power, 114 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 22 (2015).
160. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
161. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255 (1984).
162. See, e.g., Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of
Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998
SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1998).
163. Johnson, supra note 147, at 61 (citing Registration and Monitoring of Certain
Nonimmigrants, 65 Fed. Reg. 52584, 52585 (Aug. 12, 2002)).
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Trump issued an executive order restricting immigration from
seven majority-Muslim countries.164 The executive order directly
impacted families with cognizable reunification claims. At this
juncture, it is impossible to predict with any certainty how our
current Supreme Court would view a challenge to this type of
restriction, much less how a Court that includes Trump-appointed
Justices will view it.
Two observations bear making, however. The first is that the
Roberts Court, although often considered to be fairly
conservative, has overseen a time of expansion of family
constitutional rights via Windsor and Obergefell and
simultaneously a time of incremental diminishment of plenary
power. Professor Johnson recently characterized the Roberts
Court as one that “consistently has applied ordinary, standard,
and unremarkable legal doctrines in ordinary, standard, and
unremarkable ways” in its immigration decisions.165
Second, constitutional law moves slowly. Although the
LGBTQ rights movement appears in hindsight to have changed
public opinion about same-sex marriage overnight, the seeds of
this sea change were sown when the hierarchical understanding of
family embraced by the common law began to morph into an
individual rights-based paradigm. The development of a modern
family reunification right has occurred slowly but is now ripe
enough to be poised for affirmative recognition by our courts. If
the judiciary continues to provide a check on the executive and
legislative branches—as it has since the founding—we should
expect to live in the age of balancing for quite some time.

164. Trump’s Executive Order On Immigration, Annotated, NPR (Jan. 31, 2017, 10:46
AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/01/31/512439121/trumps-executive-order-on-immigrationannotated.
165. Johnson, supra note 147, at 62.

